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The State of Caveat Emptor in Alaska
as it Applies to Real Property
This Note looks at the impact that statutes and cases have had on
the doctrine of caveat emptor in Alaska as it has been applied to
sales of real property over the past twenty years. After examining
the history of the doctrine, the Note discusses several Alaska
Supreme Court cases involving disclosure requirements, Alaska's
mandatory disclosure law, the Uniform Land Sales Practices Act
and the use of implied warranties, all of which weaken the
doctrines impact on sales of real property. The Note then looks
at two cases recently decided by the Alaska Supreme Court, State
v. Carpenter and Stormont v. Astoria Ltd. These cases could
signal a change in the supreme court's treatment of the doctrine of
caveat emptor, especially when compared to the earlier decisions
involving disclosure requirements. Finally, the Note concludes
that although the doctrine of caveat emptor no longer applies to
sales of residential real estate, it is still applicable to sales of
commercial real estate The Note recommends that the doctrine
of caveat emptor only be applied when the purchaser of commer-
cial real estate is an experienced and knowledgeable business
person who has the ability to protect his or her interests.
I. INTRODUCrION
"Caveat emptor, qui ignorarea non debuit quod jus alienum
emit." This Latin phrase, translated as "let the buyer beware, who
ought not be ignorant of the amount and nature of the interest
which he is about to buy, exercise caution,"' first appeared on
signs in ancient Roman markets.' As recently as 1960, hornbook
law considered the doctrine of caveat emptor applicable to the sale
Copyright © by Alaska Law Review
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of real estate.' However, in more recent years, the doctrine has
begun to erode in many states, including Alaska.
After briefly examining the history of caveat emptor in Part II,
this Note will discuss the state of caveat emptor in Alaska today.
Sub-part A of Part III will examine the seller's duty of disclosure.
While a vendor originally had no duty of disclosure, this view has
been abandoned in recent years. This sub-part of the Note will
review several Alaska Supreme Court cases that dealt with the
issue of disclosure and helped lead to the passage of a mandatory
disclosure law in Alaska. Sub-part B of Part III will discuss
Alaska's mandatory disclosure law, looking at why the law was
enacted, to whom it applies and the effect it has had on the
doctrine of caveat emptor. Sub-part C of Part III will examine the
Uniform Land Sales Practices Act,5 which Alaska enacted in 1977.
This Sub-part will discuss the various elements of the Act and an
interesting side effect of the law. Sub-part D will cover implied
warranties. Although the Alaska Supreme Court has accepted the
use of implied warranties, two issues still remain: whether these
warranties also apply to sales of commercial real estate and
whether they can be disclaimed.
Finally, Part IV of this Note will look at two cases recently
decided by the Alaska Supreme Court and the possible impact they
will have on the doctrine of caveat emptor in Alaska. These cases
could signal a change in the court's treatment of the doctrine as it
applies to real property. The section recommends that while caveat
emptor should not be abandoned entirely in Alaska, it should apply
only to purchasers of commercial real estate who, through their
knowledge and experience, have the ability to detect and protect
themselves from defects.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CAVEAT EMPTOR
The doctrine of caveat emptor as it applies to real estate
originated in England during the Middle Ages, a time when
agriculture was the sole purpose of land.6 The doctrine was
premised on the purchaser's ability to discover and protect himself
from defects in the property through prior inspection,' since the
quality of the land took precedence over the quality of the
3. Jack R. Lawrence, Homebuilder's Liability for Physical Defects After the
Sale, 7 OKLA. Crry U. L. REV. 49, 49 (1982).
4. ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.70.010-.70.200 (Michie Supp. 1995).
5. Id. §§ 34.55.004-.55.046 (1977).
6. Scheid, supra note 2, at 158.
7. Frona M. Powell & Jane P. Mallor, The Case for an Implied Warranty of
Quality in Sales of Commercial Real Estate, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 305, 308 (1990).
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structures on the land.! Furthermore, it was assumed that the
vendor and purchaser were of equal bargaining positions and
engaged in arm's-length transactions, and that the buyer therefore
did not need special protection.'
The doctrine of caveat emptor was incorporated into the
American common law in the nineteenth century during the
industrial revolution." At that time, courts generally refused to
interfere with business ventures, often holding that a purchaser
must take care of his own interests." While real estate needs had
shifted from agrarian to urban, courts still assumed that the vendor
and purchaser were operating from equal bargaining positions. 2
Under the doctrine of caveat emptor, the seller is not required
to disclose to the purchaser any facts that might affect the value of
the property.3  In the 1800's, Lord Cairns wrote that "mere
nondisclosure of material facts, however morally censurable ...
would in my opinion form no ground for an action in... misrepre-
sentation."'4 In addition to following this view, the English and
American courts consistently held that no implied warranties
existed in the sale of new or used dwellings. 5 Thus, if the
purchaser did not obtain an express warranty or show proof of
fraud, "the doctrine of caveat emptor precluded the plaintiff's
recovery for defects in his home purchased from the defendant
builder-vendor."' 6
However, as society grew more complex, courts slowly
abandoned the doctrine of caveat emptor, at least in the area of
residential real estate. They increasingly imposed stricter disclosure
requirements as well as implied warranties in the sale of housing.
One reason for this shift is the dramatic change in home-buying
8. Caryn M. Chittenden, Comment, From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Equity
- The Implied Warranty of Quality Under the Uniform Common Interest
Ownership Act, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 571, 578 (1992).
9. Id.
10. Scheid, supra note 2, at 159.
11. Comment, Caveat Vendor - A Trend in the Law of Real Property, 5
DEPAUL L. REV. 263, 264 n.7 (1956); see Barnard v. Kellog, 77 U.S. 383 (1870)
(holding that business needs are best served through the use of the doctrine of
caveat emptor).
12. Lawrence, supra note 3, at 52.
13. Scheid, supra note 2, at 158.
14. Peek v. Gurney, L.R. 6 H.L. 377, 403 (1873).
15. Lawrence, supra note 3, at 50.
16. Barbara Fredericks, Commercial Law-Implied Warranties in Sales of Real
Estate - The Trend to Abolish Caveat Emptor, 22 DEPAUL L. REv. 510, 512
(1972).
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practices that occurred after World War 11.17 As the demand for
residential real estate increased, builders began producing houses
in mass quantities."8 This frequently left buyers unable to closely
inspect the real estate for defects prior to purchase.19 In addition,
the increasing complexity of houses made it more difficult for the
buyer to detect hidden defects.' As a result of these changes, the
courts were increasingly pressured to abandon the doctrine of
caveat emptor 2'
The first time an English court refused to apply the doctrine
of caveat emptor was in 1931 in the case of Miller v. Cannon Hill
Estates, Ltd.' The court, by way of dictum, stated that the law
presumes an implied warranty of habitability (1) when a home is
purchased while still under construction and (2) when the home is
so defective as to render it uninhabitable.' Although only
dictum, this exception to caveat emptor ultimately became the law
in England.24
The rules set out in Miller were first adopted by an American
court in 1957, in Vanderschrier v. Aaron.' The court retained the
rule that the house must be unfinished at the time of purchase in
order for the warranty of habitability to apply.26 The continued
distinction between sales of houses still under construction and
completed houses was premised on a presumption that the
purchaser of a finished home could either inspect the property or
bargain for express warranties.27
Colorado became the first state to abandon the distinction
between completed and unfinished houses and imply a warranty of
habitability in a new home.' The court reasoned
[t]hat a different rule should apply to the purchaser of a house
which is near completion than would apply to one who purchases
a new house seems incongruous. To say that the former may
17. Lawrence, supra note 3, at 53.
18. 1&
19. ML
20. Powell & Mallor, supra note 7, at 310.
21. Fredericks, supra note 16, at 512.
22. 2 K.B. 113 (1931).
23. 1& at 120-21.
24. Lawrence, supra note 3, at 52 (citing Bruce Farms, Inc. v. Coupe, 247
S.E.2d 400 (Va. 1978)).
25. 140 N.E.2d 819 (Ohio App. 1957).
26. Id. at 821.
27. Powell & Mallor, supra note 7, at 308.
28. Carpenter v. Donohoe, 388 P.2d 399 (Colo. 1964).
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rely on an implied warranty and the latter cannot is recognizing
a distinction without a reasonable basis for it.29
Over the next decade, most states' courts, including Alaska's,"
followed Colorado and rejected the doctrine of caveat emptor in
the sale of homes, replacing it with an implied warranty of
habitability or an implied warranty of workmanlike construction?'
In addition to imposing implied warranties in the sale of
housing, courts have also adopted stricter disclosure require-
ments. Traditionally, vendors of real estate could not commu-
nicate any falsehoods or actively conceal any defects in the
property.3 Nevertheless, the law imposed no affirmative duty on
sellers to disclose material facts.' There have always been
exceptions to this general rule, however. For example, if the seller
chooses to speak about a material fact, he must disclose enough
information so as not to mislead the buyer.35 Another exception
provides that if a seller makes an assertion that he later learns is
incorrect, he has a duty to inform the purchaser of his mistake.
3 6
Where the parties are in a confidential or fiduciary relationship,
courts have also made an exception to the traditional rule and
required disclosure of all material facts.37
In recent years, many courts have recognized that buyers and
sellers of residential property are no longer of equal bargaining
positions. This change in the relationship between buyers and
sellers frequently leaves buyers unable to protect themselves by
inspecting the property or demanding express warranties?8 As a
result, the majority of state courts have imposed a duty of disclo-
sure where the seller has knowledge of concealed or latent defects
in the property that cannot be discovered with reasonable diligence
by the purchaser.39 Like several other states, the Alaska legisla-
ture has gone even further by passing a mandatory disclosure
law.40
29. Id. at 402.
30. Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Collins, 794 P.2d 936 (Alaska 1990).
31. Powell & Mallor, supra note 7, at 309.
32. Scheid, supra note 2, at 161.
33. Robert M. Washburn, Residential Real Estate Condition Disclosure
Legislation, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 381, 386 (1995).
34. Id at 387.
35. Id.
36. Frona I. Powell, The Seller's Duty to Disclose in Sales of Commercial
Property, 28 AM. BUS. LJ. 245, 252 (1990).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 254.
39. Id. at 255.
40. ALAsKA STAT. §§ 34.70.010-.70.200 (Michie Supp. 1995); see infra text
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Although the doctrine of caveat emptor as it applies to
residential real estate has been greatly eroded in most states, many
states still apply the doctrine to sales of commercial real estate.
The continued application of the doctrine is based on a presump-
tion that purchasers of commercial property have greater experi-
ence and do not need the same protection as residential real estate
purchasers.4' As a result of this presumption, courts often hold a
commercial purchaser to a higher standard of diligence in discover-
ing defects than that which is required for residential purchasers.42
In addition, courts are divided over whether the protection of
implied warranties extends to purchasers of commercial proper-
ty .
3
III. THE STATE OF CAVEAT EMPTOR IN ALASKA: STATUTES
AND WARRANTIES
A. Disclosure Requirement
In 1992, the Alaska Legislature passed a law entitled "Disclo-
sures in Residential Real Property Transfers,"' which requires the
transferor of residential real property to make a written disclosure
to the transferee about the condition of the property. This law was
passed, in part, as a result of the lobbying effort conducted by the
National Association of Realtors ("NAR") in response to various
judicial decisions that had held in favor of the buyer of real
property on grounds of nondisclosure.45
Traditionally in Alaska, to recover for defects in the property
that were not discovered prior to purchase, a buyer would have to
prove intentional misrepresentation or fraud against either the
seller or real estate broker.46 This required a buyer to establish
five elements: (1) that the seller (or broker) made a representation
to the buyer or failed to disclose a material fact; (2) that the sell-
er/broker must have known the representation to be false; (3) that
the seller/broker intended that the buyer rely on the representation;
accompanying notes 112-30 for full discussion.
41. Powell, supra note 36, at 247.
42. Id.
43. Powell & Mallor, supra note 7, at 306.
44. Disclosiires in Residential Real Property Transfers, ALASKA STAT.
§ 34.70.010 (1992). Alaska was one of the first seven states to pass a mandatory
disclosure law. See Carolyn L. Mueller, Legislative Note, Ohio Revised Code
Section 5302.30: Real Property Transfer Disclosure - A Form Without Substance,
19 U. DAYTON L. REv. 783, 783 n.1 (1994).
45. Scheid, supra note 2, at 155.
46. Mueller, supra note 44, at 794.
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(4) that the buyer acted in reliance on the representation; and (5)
that damages resulted from such reliance.47
The test's requirement that the seller/broker have knowledge
of the falsity of the representation was frequently difficult for
buyers to prove. As a result, during the 1980s the Alaska Supreme
Court retreated from this test and allowed the buyer to recover
when the seller/broker made a negligent misrepresentation."8 In
addition, Alaska became one of only a few jurisdictions to allow a
buyer to have a cause of action against a broker for an innocent
misrepresentation.49
In Cousineau v. Walker,"0 the Alaska Supreme Court allowed
the purchaser of land to rescind the land sale contract as a result
of an innocent misrepresentation made by the seller.5' The
defendant, Walker, placed a multiple listing for 9.1 acres of land
with a realtor.52 The listing stated that the property had 580 feet
of highway frontage and a minimum of 80,000 cubic yards of
gravel.53 The purchaser, a contractor in the gravel extraction
business, became aware of the property when he saw the multiple
listing.54 He visited the property in an attempt to determine the
lot's road frontage, but was unable to do so because the property
was covered with snow.55 Shortly after purchasing the property,
the plaintiff learned that there was only 415 feet of highway
frontage, not 580 feet.56 Furthermore, the plaintiff discovered that
the property contained only 6000 cubic yards of gravel Having
already paid $99,000, the plaintiff ceased making payments and the
defendant reacquired the property." The trial court denied the
purchaser recision and restitution, holding that "the information
which allegedly formed the basis of the misrepresentation was not
material in the instant transaction, the agreement reached by the
parties was valid and does not suffer any taint or defect of
misrepresentation." 9
47. Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757, 759 (Alaska 1982).
48. Id.; Cousineau v. Walker, 613 P.2d 608 (Alaska 1980).
49. Wisconsin, Ohio and Minnesota have also allowed recovery for an innocent
misrepresentation. Washburn, supra note 33, at 400 n.144.
50. 613 P.2d 608 (Alaska 1980).
51. d. at 616.
52. Id at 609.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 610.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 611.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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The Alaska Supreme Court reversed the trial court, ruling that
three questions must be resolved to determine whether the
purchaser is entitled to recision and restitution on the basis of the
seller's misrepresentations: (1) whether the purchaser relied on the
statements; (2) whether the statements were material to the
transaction; and (3) if so, whether the purchaser's reliance was
justified.'
After affirmatively answering questions one61 and two,62 the
court looked to whether the purchaser was entitled to rely on the
seller's misrepresentation. The defendant argued that the plaintiff
was an experienced businessman and that therefore the doctrine of
caveat emptor precluded recovery.' The court rejected this,
however, noting that
in the area of commercial and consumer goods, the doctrine of
caveat emptor has been nearly abolished by the Uniform
Commercial Code and imposition of strict products liability. In
real property transactions, the doctrine is also rapidly receding
There is a split of authority regarding a buyer's duty to
investigate a vendor's fraudulent statements, but the prevailing
trend is toward placing a minimal duty on a buyer. 6
The court concluded by holding that "[a] buyer of land, relying on
an innocent misrepresentation, is barred from recovery only if the
buyer's acts in failing to discover defects were wholly irrational,
preposterous, or in bad faith."'
This case is important in several respects. The court could not
have been any clearer in signaling its retreat from the doctrine of
caveat emptor as it applies to real property. In addition to noting
various ways both Alaska and other states have receded from the
doctrine, such as through a plying implied warranties of merchant-
ability to new home sales, and enacting the Uniform Land Sales
Practices Act67 and the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant
Act,68 the court placed only a minimal duty on the buyer to
investigate and discover the true facts about the property. Since
the original purpose of the doctrine of caveat emptor was to
require the buyer to investigate and detect defects in the property
60. Id at 611-13.
61. Id at 612.
62. Id. at 613.
63. Id at 614.
64. Id
65. Idt at 616.
66. Id. at 614.
67. ALAsKA STAT. §§ 34.55.004-.55.046 (Michie 1977).
68. It §§ 34.03.010-.03.380 (Michie 1990).
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prior to purchasing it,69 this was indeed a dramatic abandonment
of the doctrine. Perhaps most surprising is that Cousineau did not
involve residential property or a naive purchaser. Although many
courts had been willing to protect residential purchasers, courts had
been less willing to afford relief to purchasers of commercial
property since they are presumed to be better able to protect
themselves." Nevertheless, the purchaser in Cousineau was an
"experienced businessm[a]n who frequently bought and sold real
estate."'" Furthermore, the purchaser's actions "may well have
exhibited poor judgment.... ", 2 Thus, this case suggests that "in
cases of active misrepresentation courts today are more likely to
blame the maker of a misrepresentation than the negligent
victim."'73 As a result of Cousineau, it appeared that Alaska was
moving from caveat emptor to caveat venditor.
In Bevins v. Ballard,74 the Alaska Supreme Court extended
Cousineau and held not a seller of real estate, but a real estate
broker liable for making an innocent misrepresentation.75 The
sellers of a lot with an unfinished dwelling on it told their real
estate broker that the property contained a well capable of
supporting the reasonable water needs of the residents of the
house. The broker passed this information on to the purchasers
of the lot, who then discovered that the well could not provide
sufficient water.77 The purchasers sued both the sellers and the
real estate broker for misrepresentation, claiming that the broker
had a duty to check the well's condition.7" The trial court found
for the purchasers, and only the real estate broker appealed. 79
The Alaska Supreme Court found the real estate broker liable
for the innocent misrepresentation. 0 The court noted that parties
to real estate transactions frequently do not deal on equal terms
and reasoned that since real estate brokers are licensed profession-
als, prospective purchasers tend to rely on a broker's representa-
tions.8' Since a purchaser can rely on an owner's representations,
69. See Powell & Mallor, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
70. Powell, supra note 36, at 247.
71. Cousineau, 613 P.2d at 613.
72. Id. at 616.
73. Powell, supra note 36, at 258.
74. 655 P2d 757 (Alaska 1982).
75. Id. at 763.
76. Id. at 759.
77. IM.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 763.
81. Id.
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as in Cousineau, they also should be able to rely on the broker's
representations.8 Otherwise, brokers could "use misleading
statements in selling the property, yet remain immune from liability
by simply remaining ignorant of the property's true characteris-
tics."'83 The court concluded that "a purchaser who relies on a
material misrepresentation, even though innocently made, has a
cause of action against the broker originating or communicating the
misrepresentation."'
Bevins not only reaffirmed Cousineau, it also shifted the
burden to inspect the property further away from the purchaser
and onto the real estate broker. The court stated that brokers can
protect themselves from liability by investigating the sellers'
statements or by requiring the sellers to sign a statement that the
representations made are true and providing for indemnification if
they are not.' Of course, under the doctrine of caveat emptor,
the burden was on the purchaser to determine whether there were
any defects in the property and whether the sellers' statements
were correct.
8 6
The dissent in Bevins recognized the large burden the majority
decision placed on real estate brokers: "Allowing an innocent
misrepresentation action against the broker in such circumstances
is quite close to imposing strict liability. There is no reason to
make the broker the 'insurer' of the seller's representation. '
This trend of holding real estate brokers liable for sellers' misrepre-
sentation would eventually lead to the NAR's endorsement of
mandatory disclosure laws. 8
Despite the apparent willingness of the Alaska Supreme Court
to retreat from the doctrine of caveat emptor, it did not abandon
the doctrine entirely. While the seller of real property was placed
under increased pressure either to disclose material facts about the
property or risk liability, this duty was limited to the disclosure of
latent defects only.9 The seller was not required to disclose
patent or obvious defects because the purchaser should be able to
discover these defects through ordinary inspection and inquiry.9"
Whether a defect is obvious is a question of fact and depends on
82. Id.
83. Id
84. Id
85. Id
86. See supra notes 6-16 and accompanying text.
87. Bevins, 655 P.2d at 764.
88. Scheid, supra note 2, at 155.
89. Powell, supra note 36, at 257.
90. Id at 267.
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the particular circumstances of each case.9 The case Matthews v.
Kincaid2 presents a good example.
Matthews listed his apartment building for sale with a real
estate agency where he was a broker.93 The property had no off-
street parking, but on the listing agreement, Matthews left the
space next to "parking units" blank. 4  Kincaid purchased the
building after dealing only with Matthew's real estate broker. Prior
to the purchase, the broker told Kincaid that there was parking at
the building next door.9' The broker then contacted Matthews to
clarify the parking situation and Matthews informed her that
parking was available on the street for twenty-two out of twenty-
four hours a day.16 There was a dispute over whether the broker
told Kincaid this information.97 After Kincaid purchased the
property, she was told not to have tenants park in the lot next
door.9 About a year later, the city closed the street on which the
property was located and towed away several of the tenants'
cars. 9 The property was subsequently foreclosed by the holder of
the first deed of trust Kincaid had assumed." Kincaid brought
suit against Matthews and his broker, seeking damages for
fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation that the property
contained off-street parking.'' The jury found for Kincaid, and
Matthews appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence of
fraud or misrepresentation to sustain the jury verdict."°
The Alaska Supreme Court set aside the jury verdict and
found for Matthews. Since Matthews had made no affirmative
misrepresentations, the court stated that in order to prevail in an
action for misrepresentation, Kincaid had to prove that Matthews
had a duty to disclose certain information and that he failed to
disclose that information."4 The court held that the lack of off-
street parking was an obvious fact that an ordinary purchaser
would be expected to discover by ordinary inspection and inquiry.
91. Id. at 266.
92. 746 P.2d 470 (Alaska 1987).
93. Id at 470.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 472.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 471.
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Therefore, Matthews was not required to disclose this information,
and he could not be held liable for his nondisclosure.10 5
The decision in Matthews indicates the supreme court's
unwillingness to abandon caveat emptor entirely. Although the
court noted that a seller has a duty to disclose material facts that
are concealed or unlikely to be discovered, it refused to require a
seller to disclose material facts that are obvious.10 6
Nevertheless, the decisions in Cousineau, Bevins and Matthews
demonstrate the court's dramatic retreat from the application of the
doctrine of caveat emptor to real estate sales. The retreat has most
clearly affected sellers and brokers. Although sellers and brokers
previously had no duty to disclose and would not be held liable for
innocent misrepresentations, they now must disclose material facts
that would not be obvious to a buyer and will be held liable so long
as the buyer's actions in failing to discover the defects were not
wholly irrational, preposterous or in bad faith. 7
The willingness of the Alaska Supreme Court, as well as other
states' courts, to impose liability on real estate brokers for even
innocent misrepresentations alarmed members of the NAR. a
Ultimately, a California appellate court decision led the NAR to
push for mandatory disclosure legislation."° In Easton v. Strass-
burger,"0 the California Court of Appeals held that a real estate
broker not only has a duty to disclose known material facts, but
also has an affirmative duty to inspect the property diligently and
disclose to the buyer all facts revealed by the inspection that
materially affect the value or desirability of the property."'
Echoing the court's dramatic expansion of real estate brokers'
duties, in 1985 California passed the first mandatory disclosure
statute."' Although the California statute is the most compre-
hensive, sixteen other states, including Alaska, also have adopted
disclosure legislation."
105. kd at 472.
106. Id at 471-72.
107. Cousineau, 613 P.2d at 616; Bevins, 655 P.2d at 763.
108. Scheid, supra note 2, at 168-69.
109. Id
110. 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
111. Id. at 390.
112. Cal. S.B. 453, ch. 223, § 4 (1985) (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1102-
1102.15, 2079-2079.10 (West 1994)).
113. Washburn, supra note 33, at 410.
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B. Alaska's Mandatory Disclosure Law
Alaska enacted its mandatory disclosure law on July 14,
1992."1 As with the other states' disclosure statutes, the Alaska
act requires the seller of residential real property to complete and
deliver a written disclosure statement in the form established by the
state's real estate commission."' However, unlike the acts of
most other states, the Alaska act does not provide any uidance
concerning the categories of information to be disclosed.16 Also,
Alaska is the only state to restrict the statute to single-family
dwellings or to two single-family dwellings in one building."7 In
addition, the statute does not apply to the first transfer of property
that has never been occupied.'8
According to the statute, if the purchaser receives the
disclosure statement or a material amendment to the statement
after the purchaser has made a written offer, the purchaser can
terminate the offer by delivering a written notice of termination
within three days after the disclosure statement or amendment is
delivered in person, or within six days after the disclosure state-
ment or amendment is delivered by mail."9 However, once the
seller discloses the existence of a defect or other condition in the
property being sold, the seller is shielded from any liability arising
from that defect or condition12
Beyond the right of the buyer to rescind his or her purchase
offer, the Alaska statute provides an express remedy for failure to
comply with the statute. A person who negligently violates the
statute or fails to perform a duty imposed by the statute is liable to
the buyer for the amount of actual damages suffered by the buyer
as a result of the violation or failure.' If the violation or failure
was willful, the purchaser may recover up to three times the actual
damages suffered." In either case, the court may also award the
buyer costs and attorney fees to the extent allowed under the rules
of the court."z Finally, the statute allows the buyer and seller to
114. ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.70.010-.70.200 (Michie Supp. 1995).
115. Id. § 34.70.010.
116. Id. § 34.70.050; see Washburn, supra note 33, at 425 (Delaware also leaves
the content of the disclosure form entirely within the discretion of the appropriate
regulatory body).
117. ALASKA STAT. § 34.70200 (3).
118. Id § 34.70.120.
119. Id § 34.70.020.
120. Id § 34.70.030.
121. Id § 34.70.090(b).
122. Id § 34.70.090(c).
123. Id. § 34.70.090(d).
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waive the applicability of the statute to the property sale by
agreeing to do so in writing. 24
In effect, the Alaska disclosure statute codifies the common
law approach to disclosure requirements. For example, the statute
follows the holding in Cousineau requiring the seller to disclose to
the buyer all material facts about the property." However, in a
departure from the common law, the statute eliminates the
distinction between latent and patent defects that was at issue in
Matthews.'" Instead, the statute requires all material facts to be
disclosed, not just the ones that the buyer could not discover by
inspection. Furthermore, the statute relieves real estate brokers
from the responsibility of inspecting the property themselves, so
agents are shielded from the liability that the court imposed in
Bevins.27
It must be noted, however, that the disclosure statute applies
only to residential property, not to commercial transactions. Thus,
commercial purchasers must still inspect the property for obvious
defects before they can recover damages. While caveat emptor has
for the most part been extinguished for residential purchasers, it
still remains, in part, a viable doctrine for commercial real property.
C. Uniform Land Sales Practices Act
Although most commercial real property is still subject to the
doctrine of caveat emptor in Alaska, the passage of the Uniform
Land Sales Practices Act' in Alaska in 1977 nullified the use of
the doctrine as it applied to certain forms of subdivided property.
The real estate boom of the last three decades caused property
development to flourish all over the United States. 9 Unfortu-
nately, this period also saw the rise of fraudulent developers who
sold worthless property, as well as well-intentioned developers who
lacked sufficient capital or managerial skills to complete develop-
ment projects and deliver the developed land as promised.3 As
a result, innocent purchasers were spending large sums of money
to purchase real estate that was either worthless or that would
never be developed as planned.13 '
124. Id. § 34.70.110.
125. Cousineau v. Walker, 613 P.2d 608, 616 (Alaska 1980).
126. Matthews v. Kincaid, 746 P.2d 470, 472 (Alaska 1987).
127. Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757, 763 (Alaska 1982).
128. ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.55.004-.55.046 (Michie 1977).
129. Ralph Bellar, Jr., Regulating the Real Estate Industry. The Problem of Dual
Registration, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 145, 145 (1988).
130. Id.
131. Id.
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In response to these abuses, federal and state regulation was
enacted to regulate the land sales industry. Congress passed the
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act,' as Title XIV of the
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968. At the same time,
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
met to draft a Uniform Land Sales Practices Act,'33 which was
approved in 1967."M  Alaska adopted this Uniform Act in
1977.35 The purpose of both acts is to protect purchasers by
placing them in an equal bargaining position with developers
through registration, disclosure and antifraud requirements."
The Alaska Land Sales Act applies to any subdivided land that
is located in the state.' 7 The Act also applies if the subdivider's
principle office is located in Alaska, or if an offer or disposition of
subdivided land is made in the state.s Thus, the Act may apply
even if the subdivided land is located in another state. If for
example, a developer with subdivided land in New York contacts
a purchaser in Alaska about buying a lot, the Act will apply.
For the purposes of the Act, a "subdivision" or "subdivided
land" is land that is divided or is proposed to be divided for the
purpose of disposition into two or more lots, parcels, units or
interests.3 9 It also includes any land that is offered as a part of
a common promotional plan of advertising and sale, regardless of
the number of lots."4 Disposition is defined as including the sale,
lease, assignment, award by lottery, or any other transaction
concerning a subdivision, if undertaken for sale or profit.' Thus,
the Act's jurisdiction is relatively broad, especially when compared
to the jurisdictions established by some of the other states that
have adopted variations of the Land Sales Act. For example, the
Kansas Land Sales Act applies only to land that is divided into fifty
or more lots. 42
There are several exceptions to the Act, however. For
example, the registration provisions of the Act do not apply if
fewer than ten separate lots located outside the state are offered by
a subdivider during a year, or if fewer than fifty separate lots
132. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1982).
133. Uniform Land Sales Practices Act, 7A U.L.A. 669 (1985).
134. Bellar, supra note 129, at 7.
135. ALAsKA STAT. §§ 34.55.004-.55.046 (Michie 1977).
136. Bellar, supra note 129, at 7.
137. ALAsKA STAT. § 34.55.032(3).
138. Id. § 34.55.032 (1), (2).
139. Id. § 34.55.044 (7).
140. Id.
141. Id. § 34.55.044 (2).
142. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3301(6) (West 1994).
1996]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
located in the state are offered during a year.143 The registration
provisions also do not apply if the land contains a residential,
commercial or industrial building, or where the builder is legally
obligated to construct such a building within one year from the
date of disposition.' In addition, the land is exempt if it would
be exempt under the federal Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure
Act.' 45
The Alaska Land Sales Act has registration and disclosure
requirements as well as antifraud provisions. The Act prohibits
persons from employing a device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
from making an untrue statement of material fact, or from omitting
a statement of material fact that would be necessary to make
statements not misleading." The Act also requires the registra-
tion of subdivided land before it can be sold and the delivery of a
"public offering" statement to the purchaser before the disposi-
tion. 47 The public offering statement "must disclose fully and
accurately the physical characteristics of the subdivided land
offered and must make known to prospective purchasers all
unusual and material circumstances or features affecting the
subdivided land."'" Thus, the Act is similar to the mandatory
disclosure law, 49 but applies to subdivided land rather than
residential real property transfers.
Under the Land Sales Act, if a person were willfully to violate
the statute, he or she would be subject to a fine of not more than
$50,000, imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than
five years, or both a fine and imprisonment.Y The Act also
provides for a civil remedy. A person who disposes of subdivided
land in violation of the Act is liable to the purchaser unless, in the
case of an untruth or omission, one of the following can be proved:(1) that the purchaser knew of the untruth or omission or (2) that
the seller did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of the untruth or omission.' If the Act
143. ALASKA STAT. § 34.55.042(a)(2) (Michie 1977).
144. Id. § 34.55.042(a)(3).
145. IM. § 34.55.042(a)(8).
146. Id. § 34.55.006 (1), (2).
147. Id. § 34.55.008 (1), (2). The registration requirements are listed in
§ 34.55.010 (1)-(15). The contents of the public offering statement are listed in
§ 34.55.012 (1)-(6).
148. Id. § 34.55.012(a).
149. Id. § 34.70.010 (Michie Supp. 1995).
150. Id. § 34.55.028.
151. Id. § 34.55.030(a).
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is violated, the purchaser may recover the consideration paid for
the lot together with interest and reasonable attorney fees. 2
As discussed, the purpose of the Land Sales Act is to protect
the purchaser of subdivided land." However, the Act can also
serve to protect the seller of subdivided land. This is what
occurred in the Alaska Supreme Court case Stepanov v. Gavril-
ovich.1 4
The defendants, the Gavrilovichs, purchased forty-four acres
of unimproved land in Anchorage in 1967." They subdivided
the land into one hundred and fifty residential building lots and
conducted soil tests to ensure that the land was suitable to
construct housing. 6 The presence of permafrost was not expect-
ed, nor was it revealed by any of the tests performed. 7 In 1970,
various contractors purchased the lots and constructed single family
homes on them.' In 1971, the houses began to subside and
additional soil testing revealed scattered areas of permafrost."9
The contractors sued the defendants, alleging breach of an implied
warranty of fitness and strict liability" ° The trial court found for
the defendants, and the contractors appealed. 6' The Alaska
Supreme Court held that under the Alaska Land Sales Practices
Act, the defendants could not be held liable. 62
The court reasoned that permafrost is an important physical
characteristic and one of the material features affecting the
subdivided land." Thus, the failure to disclose the presence of
permafrost in the public offering statement can result in civil
liability under the Act."6 However, under the Act, such liability
does not attach if the seller of the land did not know, and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the omis-
sion."s Since the defendants conducted soil tests, the court held
that they "'did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care
152. IL § 34.55.030(b).
153. See supra note 132-36 and accompanying text.
154. 594 P.2d 30 (Alaska 1979).
155. Id. at 32.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 33.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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could not have known' of the presence of permafrost."'6 There-
fore, under the Act, the defendants were exempt from liability.167
While the legislature's purpose in enacting the Land Sales Act
was to impose a system of controls on the activities of large scale
subdividers,"e the Act also shields subdividers from liability for
defects that cannot be detected with reasonable care. The Act is
therefore similar to the Residential Disclosure Act, which was
enacted to protect residential purchasers but also has the effect of
protecting real estate brokers."
The mandatory disclosure law and the Land Sales Practices
Act have significantly reduced the application of caveat emptor to
the sale of real property. Both Acts mandate clear disclosure
requirements and provide remedies for purchasers if the seller is
aware, or should be aware, of defects in the land. No longer is the
purchaser required to conduct in-depth inspections of property or
risk bearing the burden of any defects in the property. However,
these Acts are limited to specific forms of real estate and do
contain several exceptions. As a result, caveat emptor may still
apply to certain forms of real estate.
D. Implied Warranties
Aside from the two statutes enacted by the legislature, the
application of caveat emptor in Alaska has also declined as a result
of the supreme court's imposition of implied warranties to the sale
of real property. An implied warranty of habitability is an
extracontractual duty placed on those in the business of building or
selling real property.170 The warranty requires that the property
sold comply with community standards of workmanlike construction
and be fit for human habitation. As previously discussed,"
while courts in the United States initially refused to impose implied
warranties to the sale of real property, today almost all states'
courts, including Alaska, will impose an implied warranty, at least
to the sale of residential property.'73
The Alaska Supreme Court noted in a 1975 decision that
166. Id. at 35.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.70.010-70.200 (Michie Supp. 1995).
170. Powell & Mallor, supra note 7, at 312.
171. Id.
172. See supra notes 17-31 and accompanying text.
173. Joseph C. Brown, Jr., Comment, The Implied Warranty of Habitability
Doctrine in Residential Property Conveyances: Policy-Backed Change Proposals,
62 WASH. L. REv. 743, 744 (1987).
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it is well settled that, in building or construction contracts
whenever someone holds himself out to be specifically qualified
to do a particular type of work, there is an implied warranty that
the work will be done in a workmanlike manner, and that the
resulting building, product, etc. will be reasonably fit for its
intended use.174
Thus, home purchasers can recover for unreasonable defects under
a breach of implied warranty in Alaska.
However, two issues remain in Alaska with regard to implied
warranties. First, whether implied warranties apply to commercial
real estate, and, second, whether implied warranties can be
disclaimed by the builder-vendor. Two recent cases decided by the
Alaska Supreme Court suggest that implied warranties are less
likely to be enforced in connection with commercial property, and
that the court will uphold such disclaimers.' These cases and
their impact will be discussed in Part IV.
1. Commercial Property The Alaska courts have not
specifically dealt with the issue of whether implied warranties
should extend to the sale of commercial real property, and
commentators and other states' courts remain divided. Since
implied warranties are an exception to caveat emptor created to
accommodate home purchasers who cannot deal at arm's length
with builder-vendors, some commentators argue that it would not
make sense to extend this exception to commercial purchasers who
generally deal at arm's length. 76 The argument in favor of
imposing implied warranties to sales of commercial property is that
while buyers of commercial property might have more experience
than residential home purchasers, the builder-vendor still has
superior knowledge about the construction, and is in a better
position to avoid and detect defects in the structure.177 According
to this view, there is little reason to place the burden on a
purchaser, even if experienced, for defects caused by an equally
sophisticated builder-vendor.'7 s
State courts, like commentators, are also divided over whether
implied warranties should extend to commercial real property.
174. J.R. Lewis v. Anchorage Asphalt Paving Co., 535 P.2d 1188, 1196 (Alaska
1975); see also Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Collins, 794 P.2d 936, 941 (Alaska
1990) (holding that a purchaser of a home that was damaged as a result of
permafrost could recover for a breach of an implied warranty of habitability).
175. State v. Carpenter, 869 P.2d 1181 (Alaska 1994); Stormont v. Astoria Ltd.,
889 P.2d 1059 (Alaska 1995).
176. Brown, supra note 173, at 751.
177. Powell & Mallor, supra note 7, at 331-32.
178. 1&
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Several courts have refused to impose warranties on the basis that
implied warranties are designed to protect only the relatively
inexperienced residential purchaser, not those purchasing for
investment purposes.' 9  People purchasing property for invest-
ment purposes are presumed to "[have] ample opportunity to
investigate, study, appraise and assess the relative merits and
demerits of the subject matter and then to make a calculated
judgment about how profitable it will be."'"
In contrast, other courts have held that implied warranties
should be extended to commercial purchasers. For example, the
California Supreme Court, in Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Development
Co.,"8' made no distinction between residential and commercial
property when stating that builder-vendors should be held to their
implied representation "that the completed structure was designed
and constructed in a reasonably workmanlike manner."1" Simi-
larly, the New Jersey appellate court, in Hodgson v. Chin,"8 held
that the application of implied warranties to the sale of a commer-
cial building was a logical extension of theprecedents creating the
warranty in sales of residential structures.'p
Thus, whether courts are willing to extend implied warranties
to the sale of commercial real property depends upon their view of
the commercial purchaser. If the commercial purchaser is seen as
a sophisticated investor easily able to protect himself the warranty
will not be extended. However, if the court views a commercial
purchaser's ability to protect himself as not much greater than that
of a residential purchaser, the warranty will be extended." 5
2. Disclaimers Since most states' courts recognize an implied
warranty of habitability, at least as applied to the sale of residential
real property, a question arises over whether these warranties can
be disclaimed by the builder-vendor. Although courts do not look
favorably upon disclaimers, courts seem to agree that disclaimers
of implied warranties are not contrary to public policy."6 Courts
179. Hopkins v. Hartman, 427 N.E.2d 1337, 1338 (IM. App. Ct. 1981); Conklin
v. Hurley, 428 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1983).
180. Hopkins, 427 N.E.2d at 1339.
181. 525 P.2d 88 (Cal.1974).
182. Id. at 91.
183. 403 A.2d 942 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
184. Id at 945.
185. Powell & Mallor, supra note 7, at 327.
186. Judy K. Lytle, Comment, Language Stating No Warranties, Express or
Implied, Is Effective Disclaimer of Implied Warranty of Fitness and Habitability in
Sale of New House by Builder-Vendor, 15 ST. MARY's L.J. 673, 681-82 (1984).
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do not agree, however, on what constitutes an adequate disclaim-
er.' 7 Few courts have enforced "boiler plate" disclaimers or
generally worded disclaimers containing the phrases "as is" or "in
its present condition."' 8 Most courts have required that disclaim-
ers be specific and conspicuous and have required a showing that
the buyer knew and understood the meaning of the disclaimer. 9
Just as they do when evaluating the validity of an implied warranty,
courts will consider the experience of the purchaser and whether
the property involved is commercial in nature."
IV. THE STATE OF CAVEAT EMPTOR IN ALASKA: THE
RECENT CASES AND THEIR IMPACT
Two cases recently decided by the Alaska Supreme Court 9'
could signal a change in the application of the doctrine of caveat
emptor to sales of real property. These cases suggest that the court
will continue to distinguish between commercial property and
residential property and that the court will not only enforce
disclaimers, but will also enforce "as is" disclaimers.
A. The Cases
The first of these cases, State v. Carpenter, was decided in 1994.
In 1978, and again in 1981, Carpenter purchased agricultural land
from the Division of Lands of the Department of Natural Resourc-
es (the "DNR").' Both of the land sale contracts contained a
disclaimer of any guarantee of profitability as well as the following
disclaimer:
The seller makes no warranty, express or implied, nor assumes
any liability whatsoever, regarding the social, economic, or
environmental aspects of the [p]arcel, to include, without
limitation, the soil conditions, water drainage, or natural or
artificial hazards."
In addition, the contracts required Carpenter to improve and
develop the land as a working farm. 9 4 In 1980 and 1983, Carpen-
ter borrowed money from the Agricultural Revolving Loan Fund
(the "ARLF"), a state agency within the DNR that lent money to
187. Powell & Mallor, supra note 7, at 315.
188. Id.
189. Id.; Lytle, supra note 186, at 682.
190. Powell & Mallor, supra note 7, at 316.
191. State v. Carpenter, 869 P.2d 1181 (Alaska 1994); Stormont v. Astoria Ltd.,
889 P.2d 1059 (Alaska 1995).
192. Carpenter, 869 P.2d at 1182.
193. Id.
194. Id
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farmers to help them develop their land.' After repeated
unsuccessful attempts to plant, Carpenter abandoned the land in
1987 and it was reclassified as unsuitable for agriculture.'96 At
this point, Carpenter ceased making payments toward his ARLF
loans."9 The ARLE filed suit, and Carpenter claimed he was
excused from performing under the contracts.' 8 The jury found
that Carpenter was excused from his duty to repay the loans
because of mutual mistake, commercial impracticability and
misrepresentation. The state appealed.'99
The Alaska Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was
no mutual mistake of fact because the disclaimer in the land sale
contract demonstrated that Carpenter was consciously uncertain
about the character of the land and, as a result of the disclaimer,
bore the risk of the condition of the land.' The court also held
that there was no commercial impracticability as a result of the
disclaimers in the contract. " According to the court, the dis-
claimers made it clear that the problems with the soil were not
unanticipated by Carpenter.' Since Carpenter bore the risk of
the condition of the land, he could not recover on the grounds of
commercial impracticability' Finally, the court held that the
state did not make a misrepresentation about the suitability of the
land.' The court stated that "[Carpenter's] contention that he
was justified in believing that the [s]tate would not sell land and
make agricultural loans if the land was not suitable for agricultural
development is without merit, considering the specific disclaimers
in the land sales contracts."''25
The decision in Carpenter shows the court's willingness to
enforce disclaimers in land sales contracts. Despite the fact that
Carpenter purchased the land and took out loans from the state for
the express purpose of farming the land, Carpenter bore all the risk
solely as a result of the disclaimers. The court did not discuss
whether Carpenter was an experienced businessman or whether he
was made aware of the likely effect of the disclaimers. The court
also did not discuss the fact that the disclaimers were "boilerplate."
195. Id
196. Id
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1183.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1184.
203. IM.
204. Id. at 1185.
205. Id.
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Compared to the decisions of other states' courts, the Alaska court
appears to be taking a more hardline approach to the enforcement
of disclaimers.'
Stormont v. Astoria Ltd.,' decided in 1995, is the second
decision recently handed down by the Alaska Supreme Court
involving the doctrine of caveat emptor. Stormont signed a lease
with an option to purchase real property, including an eleven-unit
apartment complex, from Astoria Ltd. in April 1992. Both the
lease and option contained "as is" disclaimers.2  The option also
contained a section stating that the purchaser assumed the risk that
all or part of the real property may be inadequate, inappropriate
or unusable for the purposes intended by the purchaser.21 The
section further noted that the purchaser must make a thorough and
careful inspection of the property?"n It was obvious upon inspec-
tion that the apartment building was badly deteriorated and
required extensive repair to be habitable."' After Stormont had
begun repairing the building, the City of Fairbanks notified
Stormont that the apartment complex would be demolished.1
The city's condemnation came as a surprise to both Stormont and
Astoria.214 Stormont then filed suit against Astoria, asking
damages for, inter alia, mutual mistake of fact and frustration of
purpose.215
The supreme court found in favor of Astoria Ltd., ruling that
there was no mutual mistake of fact because Stormont bore the risk
of a mistake as to the condition of the building.216 The court's
finding that Stormont bore the risk was based on three factors: (1)
the contract contained an "as is" disclaimer; (2) Stormont had
opportunities to inspect the property; and (3) Stormont was an
experienced contractor.2 7 These factors also caused the court to
find that there was no frustration of purpose"
206. See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
207. 889 P.2d 1059 (Alaska 1995).
208. Id. at 1060.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1061.
216. Id. at 1062.
217. Id. at 1062-63.
218. Id. at 1063.
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B. Impact and Analysis of the Recent Cases
The decisions handed down in State v. Carpente?"9 and
Stormont v. Astoria Ltd.m could signal a change in the Alaska
Supreme Court's treatment of caveat emptor as it applies to real
property. As noted above, in the early 1980s, the court began to
retreat from the doctrine of caveat emptor. With Cousineau v.
Walker' and Bevins v. Ballard,' the court shifted the burden
of discovering defects in real property from the purchaser to the
seller. The court also was one of the first to hold a seller liable for
making innocent misrepresentations about the condition of the
property, even if the purchaser was an experienced businessper-
son.' However, the court was not willing to abandon the
doctrine of caveat emptor entirely, instead choosing to distinguish
between latent and patent defects in Matthews v. Kincaid.'
Despite this steady retreat, Carpenter and Stormont now
suggest that the court is unwilling to erode the doctrine of caveat
emptor any further. In fact, it may seem unclear whether the court
is beginning to back away from the earlier decisions. However,
when viewed in light of the recent statutes enacted by the Alaska
legislature, it does not appear that the court is retreating.
The deciding factor in both Carpenter and Stormont was the
presence of disclaimers. The contracts signed by the purchasers in
both cases contained "boiler plate" or "as is" disclaimers.' The
court's decisions were based on the purchaser's assumption of the
risk in signing the disclaimers.' Thus, these decisions do not
represent a retreat from the earlier decisions. None of the earlier
cases involved disclaimers; they all dealt with disclosure issues.
It is true that the court is taking a more hard-line approach to
the presence of disclaimers than other state courts. As discussed
previously,227 few courts have enforced "boiler plate" or "as is"
disclaimers, instead requiring a showing that the purchaser knew
and understood the meaning of the disclaimer." After Carpenter
and Stormont, however, it appears that in Alaska, if the purchaser
219. 869 P.2d 1181 (Alaska 1994).
220. 889 P.2d 1059 (Alaska 1995).
221. 613 P.2d 608 (Alaska 1980).
222. 655 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1982).
223. Cousineau, 613 P.2d at 608; see supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
224. 746 P.2d 470 (Alaska 1987).
225. Carpenter, 869 P.2d at 1182; Stormont, 889 P.2d at 1060.
226. Carpenter, 869 P.2d at 1183; Stormon 889 P.2d at 1062-63.
227. See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
228. Powell & Mallor, supra note 7, at 315.
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signs a contract containing a disclaimer, even if "boiler plate," the
purchaser will bear the risk that there is a defect in the property.
Of course, Carpenter and Stormont did not involve residential
purchasers. Carpenter involved the purchase of farm land, while
Stormont dealt with a commercial purchaser. It is not clear how
the court would rule in a case involving disclaimers associated with
the sale of residential real estate. Commercial buyers are often
viewed as needing less protection than residential buyers, since
commercial buyers are considered to be more sophisticated and
knowledgeable. 9 The Alaska legislature has also distinguished
between commercial and residential purchasers, exempting sales of
commercial real estate from Alaska's mandatory disclosure
statute." ° Since residential purchasers have traditionally been
given greater protection, both by the court and the legislature, it is
unlikely that the court would uphold a "boiler plate" disclaimer in
a sale of residential property.
However, the distinction drawn between commercial and
residential purchasers does represent a change from the earlier
cases. Cousineau implied that the court would not make the
residential-commercial distinction, since the test created by the
court to determine liability for misrepresentation simply referred to
"buyers of land," not just "residential purchasers."' In contrast,
Stormont indicates that such a distinction must be made, so that
buyers of commercial property will be held to stricter standards
than purchasers of residential property. The Stormont court notes
that the purchaser was an experienced contractor and that this
weighed against him332 In Cousineau, the purchaser was also an
experienced businessman, but the court found his reliance reason-
able nonethelessP3
Making a distinction between residential and commercial
purchasers might appear to be a significant retreat by the court.
However, the court may simply be following the path of the Alaska
legislature, which chose to exclude commercial purchasers from the
mandatory disclosure law. The disclosure law was enacted after the
court's decision in Cousineau, so it is not surprising that the court
has now changed its opinion. In future cases, the court probably
will take the purchaser's experience and knowledge into consider-
ation.
229. See supra notes 176-85 and accompanying text.
230. ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.70.010-.70.200 (Michie Supp. 1995).
231. Cousineau, 613 P.2d at 616.
232. Stormon4 889 P.2d at 1062.
233. Cousineau, 613 P.2d at 613.
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Taking the purchaser's experience into consideration is sensible
in light of the historical purpose of caveat emptor. The doctrine of
caveat emptor was premised on the theory that buyer and seller
were of equal bargaining positions and that the purchaser had the
ability to discover and protect himself from defects.' If the
purchaser had the knowledge and ability to discover defects, it was
unfair to place all the risk with the seller. As housing practices
changed and became more complex, residential purchasers no
longer had the sophistication and experience needed to discover
defects, and strict application of the doctrine began to make less
sense. Both the Alaska Supreme Court and the legislature
recognized the unfairness of caveat emptor and responded: the
court in its decisions in Cousineau and Bevins, and the legislature
through its passage of the mandatory disclosure law and similar
statutes. This protection of residential purchasers eliminated the
unfairness inherent in the doctrine of caveat emptor. However,
since many commercial purchasers maintain the knowledge and
ability to discover defects, the doctrine still has some value with
regard to the sale of commercial property. Following the lead of
the legislature, which chose to exclude commercial purchasers from
the protection of the mandatory disclosure law, the Alaska
Supreme Court has declined to abandon caveat emptor and instead
chose to maintain it as a viable doctrine as it applies to sales of
commercial real estate.
This extension makes sense only if it is limited to commercial
purchasers who have the experience needed to protect themselves.
If the court extends the doctrine to all commercial purchasers,
regardless of their sophistication or knowledge, the doctrine once
again becomes too harsh. The best approach is a case-by-case
determination of whether the buyers have sufficient experience to
warrant the imposition of the doctrine. Yet it is unclear whether
the court is making case-by-case determinations. Although the
buyer's experience was considered in Stormont," no mention of
the level of experience of the buyer was made in Carpenter.36
According to the court, the fact that a disclaimer was present in the
contract was sufficient to place the risk of a defect with thebuyer.2' 7
Apart from examining the impact Stormont has had on the
doctrine of caveat emptor, there is another interesting aspect of the
decision that should be examined. A footnote in the Stormont
234. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
235. 889 P.2d at 1063.
236. 869 P.2d 1181 (Alaska 1994).
237. Id. at 1183.
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opinion seems to contradict a statement made in Cousineau. In
footnote five of Stormont, the court states that "[u]nlike ... the
sale of goods, however, real property law has largely remained
sympathetic to caveat emptor."'  This statement is in marked
contrast to the opinion in Cousineau, where the court wrote "[i]n
real property transactions, the doctrine [of caveat emptor] is ...
rapidly receding." 9 Thus, while in 1980 the court felt that caveat
emptor was declining in importance as applied to real property
transactions, in 1995 it was saying that caveat emptor is still an
important doctrine. Does the conflicting opinion in Stormont signal
a dramatic reversal for the court? The answer is no.
In analyzing the two statements, it is necessary to consider the
years the two decisions were handed down, and the state of the
doctrine of caveat emptor at those times. As discussed,2' caveat
emptor was the guiding doctrine in sales of real property until after
World War II. It was not until the 1960's that courts began to
impose implied warranties and apply stricter disclosure require-
ments. Thus, between the 1960's and the 1980's, when Cousineau
was decided, the doctrine of caveat emptor was rapidly receding in
sales of real property. In that short time span, caveat emptor was
severely restricted, especially for sales of residential property. By
the time of Stormont, the state of the doctrine as applied to real
property had largely been settled by the Alaska legislature. The
passage of the mandatory disclosure law basically eliminated the
doctrine from sales of residential property, and the Alaska Land
Sales Act24' extended protection to the purchasers of subdivided
property.242 However, the legislature chose not to extend protec-
tion to most other commercial purchasers. The decision by the
legislature not to extend protection to commercial buyers is
probably what the court had in mind when it stated that "real
property law has largely remained sympathetic to caveat emp-
tor."243
Thus, in this sense, the statements in Cousineau and Stormont
are compatible. Caveat emptor had rapidly receded from its
original application. Purchasers were protected by implied
warranties, anti-fraud provisions and disclosure requirements.
However, caveat emptor was not abandoned entirely, as it still
applied to sales of certain commercial real estate. Perhaps the
238. Stormont, 889 P.2d at 1062 n.5.
239. 613 P.2d at 614.
240. See supra notes 10-21 and accompanying text.
241. ALAsKA STAT. §§ 34.55.004-.55.046 (Michie 1990).
242. See supra notes 128-49 and accompanying text.
243. Stormont, 889 P.2d at 1962 n.5.
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Stormont court overstated the sympathy for the doctrine; a great
deal of the doctrine of caveat emptor has been eroded. However,
the doctrine is still a force as applied to commercial purchasers and
because of this, the law has remained "somewhat sympathetic" to
the doctrine of caveat emptor.
V. CONCLUSION
The state of caveat emptor as it applies to real property in
Alaska has thus largely been settled, notwithstanding the recent
cases of State v. Carpenter2" and Stormont v. Astoria Ltd.245
For the most part, the doctrine no longer applies to sales of
residential property. Residential purchasers are protected by
Alaska's mandatory disclosure law as well by implied warranties.
Although the court has not yet ruled on whether a builder can
disclaim an implied warranty, it seems likely that the court would
protect a residential purchaser from such disclaimers.
On the other hand, caveat emptor still largely applies to sales
of commercial real estate. Sellers of commercial real estate still
have the obligation to disclose material defects to the purchaser
because the court has not overturned its decision in Cousineau v.
Walker.2'46 However, the court's recent decisions imply that a
seller of commercial property can disclaim implied warranties, even
through "boiler plate" and "as is" disclaimers, and that the
purchaser will bear the risk of any unknown defects.
The recent cases do not make it clear, though, whether these
"boiler plate" disclaimers will be effective against all commercial
purchasers or only knowledgeable and experienced purchasers. In
keeping with the original purpose of the doctrine of caveat emptor,
the court should uphold only disclaimers against experienced
purchasers who have the ability to protect themselves. The
doctrine was intended to force a purchaser to protect him or
herself. If a purchaser is unable to do so, the application of caveat
emptor ceases to make sense.
James R. Pomeranz
244. 869 P.2d 1181 (Alaska 1994).
245. 889 P.2d 1059 (Alaska 1995).
246. 613 Pd 608 (Alaska 1980).
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